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Citizenship After the Conservative Movement
ELISABETH ZOLLER*
ABSTRACT
Citizenship as a societal and political value has undergone major
transformations under the conservative movement that took the lead in
western democracies over the past forty years. In defining liberty as
"absence of coercion" or "freedom from any restraint," the conservatives
distorted the meaning of true liberty, which is "ordered liberty." In
insisting on self-reliance as the prerequisite of individual insertion in
society, they have precipitated an abatement in citizens' social and
political rights that have had lingering effects on the social fabric, even
today. Although these developments are domestic in nature, they greatly
impact globalization insofar as they accelerate it by belittling the feeling
of belonging to a nation in the citizens' hearts.
INTRODUCTION
Citizenship has undergone major transformations in the last
century. Massive influxes of foreigners in Europe and North America
have disrupted the traditional criteria that were used for granting it.
The principles of jus soli (right of soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood),
which link citizenship to place of birth or filiation, survive, but they are
no longer exclusive of other criteria. "Belonging" may result today from
domicile or residency, that is, mere proximity.1 Consequently, instead of
* Professor of Public Law, Universit6 Panth6on-Assas (Paris II), Visiting Professor of
Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Deep gratitude goes to Carol Greenhouse
and Lauren Robel for stimulating an exchange of ideas. Warmest thanks are due to
Rebecca Bertoloni-Meli and Peter Hook from the Indiana University Maurer School of
Law Library for splendid scientific support and to Leora Baude for careful and meticulous
editorial assistance. All errors are definitely mine.
1. From the variations in the criteria that must be satisfied in order to grant
citizenship, two opposing tendencies in the definition of belonging have emerged: "On one
hand, the expansionist view characterizes citizenship as a key concept in the survival and
the reconstruction of the state. The restrictive view, on the other hand, identifies the
decline in the relevance of citizenship as an opportunity for more appropriate and
pluralistic social configurations to take hold." H. Patrick Glenn & Dominic Desbiens,
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being granted generously, citizenship nowadays has to be "earned"2
through various tests whose legitimacy is questioned. 3 A second factor is
an attitudinal-not factual-shift that is less visible than the
demographic consequences of international migrations and has
transformed citizenship even more deeply. That factor is the impact of
forty years of conservative dominance in the United Kingdom and the
United States, and later in Europe, particularly in Germany and
France, save for a few liberal intervals. 4
The conservative movement that has developed since World War II
in the wake of the best seller by Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom,5
took off with the inauguration of Richard Nixon to the presidency in
1969. Nixon came to power with an agenda tailored by the conservative
ideology that grew out of the economic theory of neoliberalism, including
companion disciplines such as public choice analysis and economic
analysis of law. Libertarian on its margins, the conservative program
can be summarized as follows: the less State there is the better. No one
captured better the top conservative priority than Ronald Reagan, with
the slogan that propelled him to power in a landslide victory, "Get the
Government off our back!" The core idea of the conservatives was to
disempower the State and empower the self; their ambition was to
restore individual independence and individual self-reliance. Once in
Loappartenance au Qudbec: citoyennetg, domicile et rdsidence dans la masse lgislative
qudbdcoise, 48 MCGILL L.J. 117, 117 (2003) (Can.).
2. See Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform,
23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 135-36 (2011).
3. Some scholars find these tests deeply illiberal. This is the case when the tests ask
for religious neutrality on the part of the candidate for naturalization and request her to
forgo any ostentatious proselyte's garments such as the burka. The recently enacted
Charter presented for the signature of every candidate for French citizenship, titled
"Charter of Rights and Duties of the French Citizen," requests that he or she abide by
laicit6. See Dcret 2012-127 du 30 janvier 2012 approuvant la charte des droits et devoirs
du citoyen frangais pr~vue A larticle 21-24 du code civil [Decree 2012-127 of January 30,
2012 Approving the Charter of Rights and Duties of French Citizens under Article 21-24 of
the Civil Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 31, 2012, p. 1769, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000025241393. For a criticism of French immigration
law, see Liav Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to
Citizenship in Europe, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 53, 64-65 (2010).
4. These intervals include the era under Bill Clinton in the United States (1992-
2000), Tony Blair in the United Kingdom (1997-2007), and Gerhardt Schroder in Germany
(1998-2005). In France, the conservative movement took a strong hold in 1995 with the
election of Jacques Chirac, and has been unbroken save for the socialist interval under
Lionel Jospin (1997-2002), reaching its apex under the mandate of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-
2012).
5. Friedrich Hayek, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). In a nutshell, the book
demonstrated that socialism and planning led to serfdom.
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power, the conservative parties carried out this agenda with steadfast
determination. They withdrew the rules (airline deregulation in the
United States) or dismantled the institutions (breaking down the power
of the workers' unions in the United Kingdom) associated with the
welfare state. In the United States, the conservative agenda unfolded
into three public policies. First, restoring individual independence and
self-reliance meant a downsizing of the federal government together
with a shifting of responsibilities to the states, which meant a new life
for federalism and a resurrection of states' autonomy by a new
distribution of powers between the federal government and the states.
Second, restoring individual independence additionally meant a shifting
of public responsibilities to the private sector, and thus, the
privatization of large portions of governmental activities that used to be
regarded as public services guaranteed by the State to its citizens.
Third, restoring individual self-reliance eventually meant limiting the
support that the federal government could bring, using its laws or its
money, to those who were unable to be as self-reliant as the
conservatives felt they should be.
Conservative programs had a profound impact on citizenship. The
reason, pure and simple, is that citizenship does not equate with
nationality. Citizenship is a foundational and structural institution of
democracy, insofar as it is both a legal status and a societal and political
value. As a status, citizenship bestows a collection of rights and a set of
responsibilities on individuals who are free and equal in rights. As a
value, citizenship determines the republican character of a society, since
"as members of a common enterprise, all citizens [are] recognized as
having civil, political, and social rights that . . . ensure them full
membership in the life of the society."6 Both aspects are, of course,
intertwined in reality, which explains why citizenship is meaningful in
relation both to government and to society. In relation to government,
citizenship is shaped by the liberal discourse that puts emphasis on
individual rights; in relation to society, citizenship is, rather, framed by
the republican discourse that insists on cohesiveness of society as a
community7-ideally, a society that is a community, a "Gemeinschaft,"
not only a "Gesellschaft."8 Concretely, vis-A-vis government (or the
6. Neil Brooks, Taxation and Citizenship, 48 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 353, 355 (2001)
(Can.).
7. On these two discourses, see Kathleen Knight Abowitz & Jason Harnish,
Contemporary Discourses of Citizenship, 76 REV. EDUC. RES. 653, 661-62 (2006).
8. For a classic work, the running theme of which is the opposition between
"Gesellschaft" (affection or kinship based social relationship) and "Gemeinshaft" (social
relationships based on duty to society), see generally FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY
AND SOCIETY [GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT] (Charles P. Lommis ed. & trans.,
Harper & Row 1957) (1887).
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State), citizenship is the means to and the end of liberty: the means to
liberty, insofar as it involves participation in government, particularly
through the right to vote; and the end of liberty, because men enjoy
liberty in society only if they live under laws. Vis-A-vis society,
citizenship is the other side of equality; it is so closely linked to equality
that the term "equal citizenship" is actually a tautological expression,
because in a republic citizenship by definition means equality of rights. 9
In a democracy, citizenship is not a privilege that may be granted by the
sovereign at his discretion; it is a right.
The dual face of citizenship is important because if, legally
speaking, citizenship is bestowed by the State, then socially speaking, it
is created by society. It is therefore a "social fact," in Emile Durkheim's
sense; an objective reality comprising representations and values
capable of exercising external constraint on the individual.10 It
determines the way people interact with the State and with each other;
it shapes the feelings that people have for their countrymen, the
emotions they share, and the way they view each other. Citizenship is a
culture, and without that culture, the legal status of the citizen, with
the accompanying rights and responsibilities, is meaningless. However,
that culture of citizenship made of equal respect and mutual
responsibilities barely survives today. Egotism rules society. Collective
action is increasingly difficult to undertake, as exemplified by the
rejection by large segments of the citizenry of the mandate imposed by
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on each citizen to buy
individual health insurance. Citizens are not necessarily indifferent to
their countrymen's fate, but they want to choose how much, when, how,
and to whom they give. Charity tends to take the place of solidarity, and
it demands to be customized to the individual preferences of the
citizens; individualism has never been so strong, and the lonely crowd
has never been so lonely. There is no easy answer to how this happened.
But it is suggested hereinafter that, among the many factors that led to
9. Citizenship is so crucial in a republican society that this is arguably the reason
why, in the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education, the Court pointed to compulsory
education as "the very foundation of good citizenship" in rejecting as "inherently unequal"
the "separate but equal" doctrine. 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954). In light of the decisive
connection between society and citizenship underlined by the Court, Kenneth L. Karst is
well founded in affirming, "[tihe principle of equal citizenship ... means . . . [e]ach
individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected,
responsible, and participating member." KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA:
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1989).
10. EMILE DURKHEIM, LES RftGLES DE LA MkTHODE SOCIOLOGIQUE 25 (1894), available at
http'//classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheimemile/reglesE-methode/regles-methode.html,
translated in MIvmLE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (George E. G. Catlin,
ed., Sarah A. Solovay & John H. Mueller, trans., Free Press 1965).
CITIZENSHIP AFTER THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT
this state of affairs, the conservative movement has played a decisive
role in pervading the public views that have led to an unraveling of
citizens' responsibilities and to a weakening of their rights.
I. THE UNRAVELING OF CITIZENS' RESPONSIBILITIES
Contemporary discourse on citizenship never starts with
responsibilities, but rather with rights. This is intriguing insofar as the
concept of citizenship, historically speaking, grew out of responsibilities.
In the ancient republic of Rome, responsibilities were so predominant in
citizenship that there was actually an office made of mandatory
participation in the life of the city. This participation took three forms:
military, fiscal, and political. The Roman citizen was a soldier, a
taxpayer (or an assisted member if he could not support himself), and
an elector.1 In the eighteenth century, the citizen was a member of a
republic, often depicted as a "trustee" for the society to which he
belonged, who held the right to vote and took an active role in the
government of his polity. The understanding of citizenship as a trust
and, consequently, as a power that could be misused, was central to the
common law punishment for bribery regarding the improper discharge
of the right to vote; the voter had a duty to use his vote honestly and in
the public interest. 12 Today, voters use their voting rights in their own
personal, private interest so much so that politics are commonly
regarded as being driven by individual preferences.
It is difficult to say when the change occurred. One thing is sure: in
the founding era, citizenship was not understood as only a collection of
individual rights. Thanks to the historiography of the second half of the
twentieth century, "[i]t is no longer possible"-as Cass R. Sunstein
insisted in his classical piece--"to treat the framers as modern
pluralists believing that self-interest is the inevitable motivating force
behind political behavior. Republican thought played a central role in
the framing period."'3 The appeal of individualism took hold after the
founding era. Suzanna Sherry suggests that the turning point occurred
during the twentieth century: "Everyone now has rights, but no one has
responsibilities. This form of radical individualism is a twentieth-
century innovation."'14 It might be closer to the truth to say that the last
11. CLAUDE NICOLET, LE METIER DE CITOYEN DANS LA ROME REPUBLICAINE 425 (2d ed.
1976).
12. Denis Baranger, The Eighteenth-Century Citizen, 7 EUR. REV. HIST. 251, 256-58
(2000).
13. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540 (1988).
14. Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 131, 148 (1995).
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century aggravated, rather than created, a trend that began well after
the founding era. The nineteenth century saw the triumph of what may
be called "naked liberty," that is, liberty in the absence of coercion. This
is, today, the conservative definition of liberty, par excellence, but it is
the opposite of the liberty organized by laws. "Ordered liberty" is the
only form of liberty that the Court has protected since the New Deal.15
A. From "Moral Liberty" to "Naked Liberty"
Nothing is more important to understanding how citizens'
responsibilities unraveled in the last third of the twentieth century than
the conservative definition of liberty. For the past fifty years, the
conservatives have been drumming into the public the view that liberty
means absence of coercion, which is true in the philosophical or moral
sense, but not in the legal sense. That definition was put in the
neoliberal limelight by Friedrich Hayek in his book The Constitution of
Liberty, which opens as follows: "We are concerned in this book with
that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as
much as possible in society. This state we shall describe throughout as a
state of liberty or freedom."'16 Further, the author makes his point even
clearer: "[W]e defined freedom as the absence of coercion."'17 Before
Hayek, no one had defined liberty as concisely. Even the liberal John S.
Mill, who influenced Hayek greatly with his negative version of liberty
as "freedom from," did not set aside as much as Hayek did, the need in a
society for "compulsion," "control," "coercion," or even "force" on the
individual.'8 Hayek was a libertarian ahead of his time. He marks a
breaking point in the history of modern liberty that took shape in the
revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.
1. Liberty at the End of the Eighteenth Century
American and French revolutionaries who laid down the
foundations of modern democratic systems did not define liberty as
15. See Section B infra.
16. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 11 (1960).
17. Id. at 133.
18. John S. Mill wrote, for instance, in his essay On Liberty:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual
in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be
physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of
public opinion.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1860) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.constitution.org/jsm/liberty.htm.
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merely the absence of coercion. They did not disconnect liberty and
control. They held liberty as an "unalienable right,"' 9 or a "natural and




men' 24 for their "preservation."25 These revolutionaries knew that
liberty is a myth without a "government" or a "political association."26 A
government of some sort is needed for "the Blessings of Liberty"27 to be
secured, with the result that, if governments are a necessity among
men, liberty can certainly not be defined as "absence of coercion" since
governments are, by nature and by definition, vested with the power to
affect individual rights and liberties, and thus are necessarily coercive. 28
Hence the question that needs to be asked is: If liberty was not "absence
of coercion" at the end of the eighteenth century, what, then, was it?
At the end of the eighteenth century, liberty vis-A-vis government
(or the State) was political liberty, that is, the possibility to live under a
government of laws, not of men 29-a government under whose authority
people are citizens, not subjects. True liberty was the liberty actually
enjoyed by man in relation to government and society; it was thus both
political and civil liberty. But it could not be civil without being political,
for liberty starts with the possibility to participate in the lawmaking
process, thus, with citizenship. This explains why coercion by
19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
20. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (Fr. 1789), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/rightsof.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 19.
22. Id.
23. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN, supra note 20.
24. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 19.
25. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN, supra note 20.
26. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
28. Even "[i]n protecting property the government is doing something quite apart from
merely keeping the peace. It is exerting coercion wherever that is necessary to protect
each owner, not merely from violence, but also from peaceful infringement of his sole right
to enjoy the thing owned." Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472 (1923).
29. The phrase "government of laws, not of men" gained currency when John Adams
used it in Article Thirty of the Bill of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
BARTELBY.COM, http://www.bartleby.com/73/991.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). In 1774,
Adams published articles in the Boston Gazette using the pseudonym "Novanglus." Id.
There, he credited James Harrington with having made prior use of that formulation.
NOVANGLUS No. 7 (John Adams) (1774), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 106
(Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851). Harrington
had, in fact, described government as "the empire of laws and not of men" in his 1656
work, The Commonwealth of Oceana. BARTELBY.COM, http://www.bartleby.com/73/991
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
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democratically-enacted laws was definitely not regarded as negation of
liberty. For the men of the eighteenth century, liberty had a dual
meaning, a philosophical and moral sense on the one hand, and a legal
sense on the other. From a philosophical and moral perspective, liberty
was defined as absolute freedom from restraints-total independence of
the body or the mind. From a legal standpoint, liberty was defined more
narrowly. Montesquieu set the tone of legal liberty when he defined
liberty as follows: "[L]iberty consists only in the power of doing what we
ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to
will."30 His subtle formula forms the background of the definition of
liberty adopted in Article 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen: "Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which
injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man
has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the
society the enjoyment of the same rights."31 In the United States, as
Charles Warren recalled in a classic piece on the evolutionary meaning
of "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, "'liberty' meant simply
'liberty of the person,' or, in other words, 'the right to have one's person
free from physical restraints.'"' 32 Gradually, however, after the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, liberty no longer meant "freedom from
physical restraint of the person" alone; it started to mean "freedom from
any restraint," tout court. A key factor in the evolution was the
influence of utilitarianism, the philosophy that the purpose of all action
should be to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
2. The Transformation of Liberty in the Nineteenth Century
Happiness as the aim of all action existed in the classical age of
liberty, as exemplified by the famous "pursuit of happiness" presented
as a legitimate end of individual action under a government of laws in
the Declaration of Independence. But it was not the happiness that
people are longing for today. It was the public happiness of the greatest
30. 1 M.DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XI ch.3, at
161 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., G. Bell & Sons 1914) (1748), available at
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.lib.indiana.edu/HOLPage?handle=hein.bea/solOOOl&id=210
&collection=beal&index.
31. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN, supra note 20, at art.
IV, translated in ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 229 n.37 (2d ed.
1977).
32. Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 440 (1926).
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number.33 Common wisdom held that the pursuit of private happiness
by the individual necessarily works for the benefit of all his
countrymen. 34 In case it did not, government would redress the course of
action and adjust private happiness to the public good. Reconciliation
between private happiness and public good eventually rested with the
private morality of each citizen. James Madison said before the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, "I go on this great republican principle, that the
people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and
wisdom."35 The difficulty is that citizens' virtue and intelligence turned
into relics of the past once the founders' generation was gone and a
capitalistic economy replaced the simple market economy of the
founding era.
Many political, social, and economic factors explain the
transformation. But a fatal breaking point was thrust forward in the
early nineteenth century by Jeremy Bentham, the father of
utilitarianism, who precipitated the decline of moral liberty and the
triumph of naked liberty when he endeavored to discredit Montesquieu
on the ground that
[o]f happiness, he says nothing: instead of security for
the people against their rulers, he talks of liberty: and
assumes without directly saying so, that to establish the
most perfect liberty is the proper object of all
government: whereas government cannot operate but at
33. For instance, in a paper published in 1774, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "[O]ur ancestors,
before their emigration to America, were the free inhabitants of the British dominions in
Europe, and possessed a right, which nature has given to all men, [of] ... establishing new
societies, under such laws and regulations as to them shall seem most likely to promote public
happiness." Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 435, 435 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis
added), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl4slO.html.
34. In 1787, John Stevens, Jr., commenting upon the freshly adopted Constitution,
rejoiced himself and his readers as follows:
A Government formed on this plan, requires in the execution of it,
none of those heroic virtues which we admire in the antients [sic], and
to us are known only by story. The sacrifice of our dearest interests,
self-denial, and austerity of manners, are by no means necessary. Such
a Government requires nothing more of its subjects than that they
should study and pursue merely their own true interest and
happiness.
AMERICANUS NO. 3 (John Stevens, Jr.) (1787), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, pt. 1, at 437, 441 (1993).
35. James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention Speech (June 20, 1788), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 409, available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch13s36.html.
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the expense of liberty, and then and there only is liberty
perfect, where no government has place.36
Bentham's reading of Montesquieu was very unfortunate. In
defending the right to happiness at all costs, and in doing away with
governments considered as necessarily operating at the expense of
liberty, Bentham turned the idea of liberty into "unlimited freedom," or
mere "independence." The difference between the two concepts is,
however, fundamental, because as Montesquieu said,
[w]e must have continually present to our minds the
difference between independence and liberty. Liberty is
a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a
citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer
possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would
have the same power.37
In short, and to oversimplify, when independence replaces liberty,
when the market drives the State away, the society is no longer under
the rule of law, but rather under the law of the jungle.
Utilitarianism found a very receptive audience in the
Anglo-American world, if not on the continent. In Europe, the legacy of
Roman law, a strong feeling for the State as the embodiment of the res
publica38 (the public good as the basis of the social contract) together
with an influential German philosophy driven by rationalism and
morality (as exemplified by Immanuel Kant) rolled back the market as
the driving force of society and forestalled a creed for total liberty as the
absence of coercion. In the United States, on the contrary, utilitarianism
gained wide currency in legal circles. It became the philosophical
foundation of litigation. Lawyers played a critical role in championing a
particular Hayekian vision of liberty through the pre-New Deal period.
In order to bring satisfaction to their ever-demanding clients, skillful
counsel attempted to include all a person's civil rights in the word
"liberty."39
36. 9 JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 123
(John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843).
37. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 30, at 161.
38. See ELISABETH ZOLLER, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 22,
258-59, 270-72 (2008). See generally Elisabeth Zoller, Public Law as the Law of Res
Publica, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 93 (2008).
39. See Warren, supra note 32, at 435-40 (explaining that the Bar was a highly active
force in the transformation of the concept of liberty in the nineteenth century).
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In 1838, Francis Lieber, a German-American philosopher, published
a Manual of Political Ethics, largely influenced by utilitarianism, that
was adopted by Harvard College as a textbook and was highly
commended by James Kent and Joseph Story. In 1849, Lieber published
a paper titled Anglican and Gallican Liberty in a South Carolina
newspaper, in which he lined up the following assertions:
[W]e have in the province of political freedom an
Anglican and Gallican school .... Independence in the
highest degree, compatible with safety and broad
national guarantees of liberty, is the great aim of
Anglican liberty, and self-reliance is the chief source
from which it draws its strength.
• . . Public interference is odious to [the English and
Americans]. Government with them, is not considered
the educator, leader, or organizer of society. On the
contrary, in reading the many constitutions which this
race has produced ... we almost fancy to read over all of
them the motto, "Hands off."
Quite different from Anglican is Gallican liberty.
Gallican liberty . . . is sought in the government,
and, according to an Anglican point of view, it is looked
for in a wrong place, where it cannot be found.
Necessary consequences of the Gallican view are, that
the French look for the highest degree of political
civilization in organization, that is, in the highest degree
of interference by public power. 40
In pointing to "organization" instead of "law," Lieber distorted the
meaning of the Declaration of 1789. This Declaration clearly says that
40. 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, Anglican and Gallican Liberty, in THE MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER 369, 377-383 (Philadelphia, J.P. Lippincott Co. 1881).
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"limits [to liberty] can only be determined by law," 41 that is to say,
constitutional and statutory law, since "law" in the French text always
means "the expression of the general will," that is, law adopted by the
people themselves or their representatives. His deceitful exposition of
Gallican liberty should, however, come as no surprise, for regulation of
liberty by laws is precisely what Lieber cursed as legal anathema.
Taking rights as seriously as Ronald Dworkin in the twentieth century,
he is convinced, like Lieber, that "[i]f someone has a right to something,
then it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it
would be in the general interest to do so."42 Lieber's negative views on
statutory law, which he equated with "organization," set the stage for an
enduring distaste among U.S. lawyers for the civil law system adopted
on the European Continent.4 As for Hayek, he set great store by
Lieber's opposition between Anglican and Gallican liberty and affirmed
without batting an eyelid: "[W]e have had to the present day two
different traditions in the theory of liberty: one empirical and
unsystematic, the other speculative and rationalistic. 44 Doubt may be
cast as to whether by "the present day," that is, in 1960 when The
Constitution of Liberty was published, the United States, and the
United Kingdom for that matter, still adhered to an "empirical and
unsystematic" approach to liberty. It would have been closer to the truth
to say that both countries did so adhere during the Gilded Age when
liberty-as the absence of coercion-carried the day of the policy of
laissez-faire, when the free market was the rule, and when regulation
was the exception. "Naked liberty" ruled; it was a purely idealistic
approach to liberty, based on ethical and economic theories rejected by
the Supreme Court under the New Deal, when the Court changed its
definition of liberty to meet the challenge issued to the nation by
"one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished."45
41. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN, supra note 20.
42. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 269 (1977).
43. Lieber's Kulturkampf against the civil law system forms the background of the
divide that he sets between, on the one hand, England and America, and on the other,
France in particular and the European continent in general. The thrust of his Manichean
analysis is well-illustrated by this recommendation: "The principles of our liberty,
therefore, are peculiarly necessary to the people of the European continent. Many of them
seem to fall into the same unfortunate delusion of expecting everything from organization
by public power." 2 LIEBER, supra note 40, at 388.
44. HAYEK, supra note 16, at 54 (footnotes omitted).
45. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937), in 1937
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 1, 5 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1941).
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B. From "Naked Liberty" to "Ordered Liberty"
The intrinsic contradiction of libertarianism is in its fragile ethical
foundations. Libertarians know that market rationality is not enough to
supply the civic virtues that are indispensable in a republic. But, like
the Victorians of the late nineteenth century, they rely on the 'inner
check' of classical humanism" to rein in misuses and abuses of rights
and liberties. 46 As Lieber credulously believed: "The greater the liberty,
the more the duty. For, the less bound or circumscribed we are in our
actions from without, the more indispensable it becomes that we bind
ourselves from within, that is, by reason and conscience. '47 That is why
conservatives set great store by religion, for this is where they find their
morality. True morality for them is always private, never public; it is
individual, never social.48 In their view, morality is internalized; it
resides in the inner self only. Such confidence in individual
self-control-the automatic pilot, so to speak, of their economic theory-
is appealing, even enticing, but at the same time very naive. It
convinced neither the American nor the French revolutionaries who
knew from experience that "[w]herever there is an interest and a power
to do wrong, wrong will generally be done,"49 and that this is especially
the case "between the strong and the weak, between the rich and the
poor, between the master and the servant,"50 with the result that, in
grossly unequal relations, "it is freedom which oppresses and the law
which sets free."51
1. The Demise of Libertarianism
Libertarianism foundered during the Great Depression, when the
Court acknowledged that there must be limits to liberty, reversing
course with respect to even the most entrenched ideas. At the beginning
of the last century, nowhere was liberty, defined as the absence of
46. John Patrick Diggins, From Pragmatism to Natural Law: Walter Lippmann's Quest
for the Foundations of Legitimacy, 19 POL. THEORY 519, 520 (1991).
47. 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 2 (Boston, Charles C. Little &
James Brown 1839).
48. See DAVID MARQUAND, DECLINE OF THE PUBLIC 92 (2004).
49. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 477, 477, available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl4s47.
50. R.P. HENRI-DOMINIQUE LACORDAIRE, CONFERENCES DE NOTRE-DAME DE PARIS,
Tome III, 494 (1846) (<( [E]ntre le fort et le faible, entre le riche et le pauvre, entre le
maitre et le serviteur, c'est la libert6 qui opprime et Ia loi qui affranchit)
http://gallica.bnffr/ark:/12148/bpt6k202681x.
51. Id.
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coercion, more cherished than in the right to contract about one's
affairs, particularly in employment matters, when that right was
exercised for contracts of labor. In that domain, some members of the
Court had turned liberty of contract into a dogma. For instance, in 1905,
Justice Peckham was convinced that "unreasonable, unnecessary, and
arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty"5 2 was inadmissible as a rule, on the ground that "[t]here must
be more than the mere fact of the possible existence of some small
amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with
liberty."53 Likewise, in 1923, Justice Sutherland was persuaded that
"[t]o sustain the individual freedom of action . . . is not to strike down
the common good, but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a
whole cannot be better served than by the preservation against
arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its constituent members."
54 Put
simply, it did not take long before these idealist judges discovered they
were wrong. Leaving aside the constitutional reasons why they were in
error, it is no small feat that in 1978, Ronald Coase himself reminded
hasty borrowers of economic theories for the advancement of other social
sciences, such as law, that "it by no means follows that an approach
developed to explain behavior in the economic system will be equally
successful in the other social sciences."5
5
In 1937, the Court abandoned the dogmatic approach to liberty that
prevailed during the Gilded Age. It eventually agreed with Justice
Holmes, who, as early as 1923, noticed that "[c]ontract is not specially
mentioned in the text that we have to construe." 56 Reversing course in
the landmark case West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court affirmed:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.
It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that
deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an
absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its
phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which
requires the protection of law against the evils which
52. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
53. Id. at 59.
54. Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
55. Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 208
(1978).
56. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the
people. 57
Parrish set the stage for the building of the welfare state, the
"administrative state" that has been the nightmare of conservatives for
the past fifty years. It strategically altered the definition of liberty to
effectuate a return to the pre-New Deal era. In line with Hayek, the
conservatives proposed to define liberty as "that condition of men in
which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is possible in
society."58 True, Hayek admitted that there were degrees in coercion
and that some degrees were more tolerable than others. He was too
intelligent to suggest doing away with coercion entirely. But, by
identifying liberty with the absence of coercion, he set the tone of the
discourse that conservatives have held about liberty for so long: any
governmental interference with the freedom of the individual is always
coercive by definition and thus presumed, from the outset, to be
illegitimate. The weakest point of the conservative theory is its starting
point, the definition of liberty as the absence of coercion, which is at
odds with what the Court said in Parrish.
In recalling that "the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social
organization," the Court shone a bright light on the reality that law,
which forms the backbone of social organization, is always needed in
case of any exercise of any liberty.59 If law is always needed, liberty
cannot be defined as the absence of coercion, for law is a vivid
expression of the coercive power of the state through enforcement. The
state is an inherently coercive instrument when it acts through officers
(e.g., police officers, tax officials, and judges) vested by law with the
power to make determinations or to take action with the purpose and
effect to alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, against
their own will, and thus, against their liberty. After decades of blind
adherence to idealized liberty free from any restraint, the Court rallied
around the position propounded by Montesquieu in The Spirit of Laws,
and developed by the French revolutionaries in the 1789 Declaration of
Rights of Man and the Citizen, to wit, that the liberty protected in a
social organization is never "naked," it is always organized by the
lawmakers, that is, limited when necessary, guaranteed by enforcement
mechanisms, and protected by the courts. In short, liberty in modern
democracies is always "ordered liberty," as Justice Cardozo felicitously
called it.60 No better definition of liberty in a social organization has
57. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
58. HAYEK, supra note 16, at 11.
59. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 391.
60. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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ever been found. The concept of "ordered liberty" in its conciseness
refutes the idea that liberty can be merely "absence of coercion" and, at
the same time, underlines the reason why citizenship is crucial, for only
citizenship gives to the individual the right to take part in "ordering" it.
2. The "New"Liberty
Since the New Deal, liberty may no longer be defined as mere
absence of coercion. Even before that watershed in U.S. constitutional
history, this was already the case. Actually, nobody has ever pushed the
argument that liberty was the absence of coercion, pure and simple, to
the extreme, except the anarchists who reject government. Everyone
recognizes that some degree of coercion is necessary in a social
organization; this is the price that has to be paid to secure liberty and to
enact the transformation of "natural liberty" into "ordered liberty." In
The Federalist, John Jay insisted that "[n]othing is more certain than
the indispensable necessity of government."61 Alexander Hamilton went
even further: "A nation, without a national government, is, in my view,
an awful spectacle." 62 Far from being antagonistic, liberty and
government are linked to each other; the former disappears when the
latter withers away. Even when it was invisible by contemporary
standards, as was the case in the Gilded Age, the State was very
present in citizens' daily life. Justice Holmes noticed in his dissent in
Lochner v. New York:
[S]tate constitutions and state laws may regulate life in
many ways . . . .The liberty of the citizen to do as he
likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of
others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for
some well-known writers, is interfered with by school
laws, by the Postoffice [sic], by every state or municipal
institution which takes his money for purposes thought
desirable, whether he likes it or not.63
Hayek himself recognized that "[cloercion .. .cannot be altogether
avoided because the only way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion.
Free society has met this problem by conferring the monopoly of
coercion on the state."64 But he insisted that the coercion which a
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 37 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
63. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
64. HAYEK, supra note 16, at 21 (footnotes omitted).
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government uses for this end must be "reduced to a minimum and made
as innocuous as possible by restraining it through known general rules,
so that in most instances the individual need never be coerced unless he
has placed himself in a position where he knows he will be coerced. 65
The difficulty is that these "general rules" have multiplied since
Hayek wrote his book. Nowadays, the State is omnipresent in citizens'
lives. It protects them against external and internal enemies; it even
protects them against themselves. Here is the real problem, for, as
Isaiah Berlin said, "[w]e must preserve a minimum area of personal
freedom if we are not to 'degrade or deny our nature."'66 How wide is
that area today? In the early twenty-first century, the Court was called
on to make a determination on the issue. The answer the Court gave
provides much food for thought. Per Justice Kennedy, the Court said:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in
the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not
be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond
spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct.67
If words make sense, absolute liberty-liberty as the absence of any
coercion, compulsion, or control-is the "autonomy of self." That
definition certainly encompasses liberty of religion, opinion, expression,
and sexual orientation (coercion in these various matters is never
legitimate); however, it is doubtful that it includes property, even
property at home.
The liberty to enjoy, to use, and to alienate property is, like all other
liberty, "ordered liberty." It may be more or less ordered, but there is
hardly any liberty, save the liberty of the mind, that cannot be
regulated by the state as it wants, how it wants, and when it wants,
without having to leave any choice to those affected by the legislative
program. 68 Under such conditions, to keep clinging to the idea that
65. Id.
66. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in THE PROPER STUDY
OF MANKIND 191, 198 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1997).
67. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
68. As insinuated by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in the famous case
Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services,
"[tihe Act's economic mandate to purchase [health] insurance . . . leaves no choice. ...
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liberty means the absence of coercion is a pipe dream; it is out of touch
with the necessities of the time. For, if coercion may always be imposed
on individuals, then true liberty is to give them the right to have a say
in the forms and the degree of coercion that may bear upon them. In
short, liberty is political liberty, or, as Justice Breyer put it in an
engaging and dense short essay, new liberty is "active liberty."69
Working out an opposition made by the French political theorist,
Benjamin Constant, between the collective liberty of the ancients, aimed
at ensuring the welfare of the City, and the individual liberty of the
moderns, oriented more toward the peaceful enjoyment of private
happiness, 70 Breyer argues that "we must 'learn to combine the two
together."' 71 In Breyer's opinion, the necessary combination of both
liberties is commanded by "the Constitution's democratic nature."72
Constant, too, argued for the need to combine both liberties because, as
he saw it, it was the only way to overcome naked utilitarianism:
[I]s it so true that happiness of whatever sort is
mankind's only aim? If it were, we would be moving
along a narrow path to a rather low destination ....
What our destiny calls us to is not happiness alone but
to the improvement of ourselves; and political liberty is
the most powerful, the most active means of
improvement that heaven has given us. 73
As Breyer underlined, in insisting on the Constitution's democratic
nature, the Founding Fathers were well aware that democratic
participation of the citizenry was the most important means by which
the citizen may rise to the level of moral liberty. That is why, as several
Individuals subjected to this economic mandate have not made a voluntary choice to enter
the stream of commerce, but instead are having that choice imposed upon them by the
federal government." 648 F.3d 1235, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
69. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5 (2005).
70. Benjamin Constant, De la hbert6 des anciens compar6e A celle des modernes [The
Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns] (1819), available at
http://www.panarchy.org/constant/liberte.1819.html [hereinafter Constant], translated in
EARLY MODERN TEXTs, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/conslibe.pdf. (Apr. 2010)
(Jonathan Bennett, trans.) [hereinafter Bennett].
71. BREYER, supra note 69, at 5 (quoting an excerpt from Constant, supra 70). There
can be no doubt that Constant himself did recommend a combination of the two types of
liberty; see, however, the reservations by Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer's Democratic
Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719, 1722 (2006).
72. BREYER, supra note 69, at 5-6.
73. Bennett, supra note 70, at 13.
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American scholars have argued as early as the late 1980s, when neo-
liberalism was at a peak,74 the U.S. Constitution is not made of liberal,
Lockean fabric only, but has a definitely republican component too.
Citizenship implies duties, not rights only. The conservative movement
did not object to that principle, quite the contrary, but it failed to
provide for the means to effectively enforce it because of its top priority,
to downsize government and public service, the most important means
by which citizen's rights are guaranteed.
II. THE ABATEMENT OF CITIZEN'S RIGHTS
The conservative movement came to power with the agenda of
restoring individual self-reliance and doing away with big government
on the grounds that it stifled private initiative. On its face, such an
agenda looked like a formidable boost to individual liberty, and it was in
a sense, provided that one understands the nature of the liberty at
stake: that liberty is a right of man, not a citizen's right. For a basic
tenet in the conservative discourse on rights is that the rights they care
for are the rights of man, not those of the citizen. The distinction is of
great import, because if one can be a man (or a woman) alone, one is
never a citizen alone. Etymologically, citizenship implies a "city"; it
implies a community, a society, a state. The problem is that
conservatives believe in the individual, not in society.
Nobody expressed that philosophy better than Margaret Thatcher
when she said, in a now legendary interview:
I think we have gone through a period when too many
children and people have been given to understand "I
have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with
it!" or "I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope
with it!" I am homeless, the Government must house
me!" and so they are casting their problems on society
and who is society? There is no such thing! There are
individual men and women and there are families and
no government can do anything except through people
and people look to themselves first.75
74. See generally Sherry, supra note 14; Sunstein, supra note 13.
75. Interview by Douglas Keay with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, in London, England (Sept. 23, 1987), available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org
document/106689.
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The difficulty is that, in modern democracies, society coincides with
government, because the source of all power, including governmental
power, is in the people. Therefore, it is misleading to affirm that "no
government can do anything except through the people." Quite the
contrary, a republican government can do a lot by itself, through its own
resources, its own organs, and its own institutions, because it is, as
Abraham Lincoln famously stated in the Gettysburg Address, a
"government of the people, by the people, for the people."76
Lincoln's definition of democracy took a long time to materialize. It
eventually came into being under the New Deal, when Americans
discovered the second meaning of citizenship. If the Civil War taught
the prerequisite of that republican concept-complete equality of rights
between human beings-the Great Depression confronted the American
people with the true meaning of citizenship--dependence on each other.
Franklin D. Roosevelt gave an excellent definition of citizenship when
he said in his First Inaugural Address, "[W]e now realize as we have
never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we cannot
merely take but we must give as well."77 To give flesh to
interdependence between citizens-to make it real-complex
governmental institutions and numerous administrative agencies
dedicated to public service were created. The conservative movement
has relentlessly argued that these institutions are useless because,
through their rules and procedures, they are a constant reminder to
individuals hasty to pursue happiness through their own means that
they are not alone and that they live in an organized society.
Conservative programs everywhere aimed at downsizing
government and enhancing individual self-reliance. These policies were
pursued most actively in the United Kingdom and the United States,
but also in continental Europe. Everywhere they led to a relaxation of
social cohesiveness; the social fabric unraveled in proportion to the
conservative governance; conservatives forced democracies to effectuate
a return to the pre-New Deal era, when the rights of man, not citizens'
rights, ruled the day. The change was huge as evidenced by its
consequences. Those most affected by these choices were the weakest
members of society-the elderly, the youth, women, and minorities.
True, these people can still claim that they are citizens, but only
through their voting rights. Conservatives have brought social rights
76. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at
http://showcase.netins.netlweb/creativellincolnlspeeches/gettysburg.htm.
77. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 11, 14 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
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close to the vanishing point, and they even depreciated political rights
by applying the insights of economic analysis to the political process. 78
A. The Vanishing Point of Social Rights
A top priority on the conservative agenda-restoration of
self-reliance-meant in the first place putting an end to the support
that the State may provide by its laws or its money to those who are
unable to be as self-reliant as they should be, according to conservative
morality. Social rights that had developed in the wake of the Great
Depression and World War II had to be reduced or withdrawn. These
decisions had a formidable impact on social cohesiveness, because the
social rights that Franklin D. Roosevelt presented as a "second Bill of
Rights" on January 11, 1944, carried with them a profound message for
society as a whole and for the world as well: "We cannot be content, no
matter how high that general standard of living may be, if some fraction
of our people-whether it be one-third or one-fifth or one-tenth-is ill-
fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and insecure."79
Social rights stood for an aspiration to narrow the gap between the
working class and the wealthy by associating basic human equality ("all
men are created equal")8 0 to the concept of full membership in the
community, that is, to citizenship. As T.H. Marshall explained in his
magisterial essay, Citizenship and Social Class, citizenship in the
twentieth century was turned into a template for "modifying the whole
pattern of social inequality."8 1 Many people took alarm at such
consequences, especially the wealthy. Huge financial means were
mobilized to convince the public that the "unconditional war on poverty"
launched by Lyndon Johnson in 1964 paved the road to socialism.
8 2
Today, social rights still exist, but they are offered more parsimoniously
than before, mostly to those who, through age or sickness, are no longer
capable of keeping up with the race. More importantly, they no longer
carry the same message for society. Conservatives divorced social rights
from the status of citizenship and made social rights operate rather as a
safety net for the elderly rather than as a social ladder for the young.
78. See Section B, infra.
79. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11,
1944), in 1944-45 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32, 40
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
80. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 19.
81. T.H. MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS
AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 47 (1950).
82. See Dan T. Carter, The Rise of Conservatism Since World War II 17 MAG. OF HIST.
11, 13 (2003).
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This is especially the case with access to college, which in most western
democracies is less and less supported by public policies and more and
more shifted to private choice and the private responsibility of students.
1. "No Fundamental Interest in Food, Shelter, [or] Education"8 3
As early as 1970, the Supreme Court began to limit federal
protection for the poor. Distancing itself from the Warren Court's
assertive defense of social equality through a strict scrutiny analysis of
any infringement of "fundamental interest," it decided to abide by a
rational basis approach in the areas of economics and social welfare. In
Dandridge v. Williams, the Court upheld a state welfare cap of $250 per
month per family regardless of the size of the family and its actual need,
stating: "[A] State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely
because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect."84 Two years
later, it rejected the argument that, in housing matters and shelter for
the needy, a more stringent standard than mere rationality was called
for. Stating, without denigrating "the importance of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing," the Court took its own shelter in the silence of the
Constitution: "[T]he Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
every social and economic ill .... Absent constitutional mandate, the
assurance of adequate housing . . . [is] [a] legislative, not judicial,
function[]."85
More important for the meaning of citizenship, the same rationality
test was applied to adjudicate equal protection cases in education. This
jurisprudential policy was a crucial setback for citizens' rights for, as
T.H. Marshall had noticed
[t]he right to education is a genuine social right of
citizenship, because the aim of education during
childhood is to shape the future adult. Fundamentally it
should be regarded, not as the right of the child to go to
school, but as the right of the adult citizen to have been
educated.8 6
Today, the right to education is fully complied with in most
democracies. But some schools are more equal than others. This is
particularly, though not exclusively, the case in the United States.
83. This concise phrase is borrowed from the casebook by KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 680 (17th ed. 2010).
84. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
85. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
86. MARSHALL, supra note 81, at 25.
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Called upon to rule on the constitutionality of huge discrepancies
between U.S. public schools in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment
promise of "equal protection of the laws" for all U.S. children, the Court
dodged the issue.8 7 In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,88 which challenged the constitutionality of public schools
being financed almost exclusively by means of property taxes, the Court
departed from the Warren Court's approach to education, which it
regarded as "the most important function of state and local
governments[,] . . . the very foundation of good citizenship."8 9 Without a
single reference to citizenship, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote and the
Court held,
[T]he importance of a service performed by the State
does not determine whether it must be regarded as
fundamental.
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in
... the.., societal significance of education .... Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.90
But citizenship implies education, by definition. This is so true that
education became compulsory in the nineteenth century precisely to
enable citizens to fulfill their civic duties.
Another example of how the conservative creed of self-reliance has
diminished the social rights of citizenship is the relaxation of due
process requirements for withdrawing social entitlements. In 1970, in
the wake of analysis on the "new property,"9' the Court ruled that social
benefits were legal entitlements that could be not be withdrawn without
due process of law, that is to say, without a judicial hearing, thus
requiring a procedure extremely protective of the beneficiaries of the
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
88. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
89. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
90. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30, 33.
91. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1963).
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welfare state. Six years later, thanks to the new conservative justices, 92
the Court reversed course. In Mathews v. Eldridge, it decided that due
process depended on three distinct factors: (1) the private interest
affected by the official action (some hardships are more difficult to
endure than others); (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest; and (3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedures would
entail.93 In short, the Court made it easier for the State to withdraw its
protection from those in need, implicitly forcing them to be self-reliant
even in the defense of their own rights.
2. The Reorientation of Affirmative Action
In the 1960s, the idea that some affirmative action must be
undertaken on the behalf of those who do not have equal opportunities
to make a good start in life-ironically due in part to the inequalities
between educational facilities at the primary and secondary levels-
developed among the white liberal elite. Announced in 1962 by
President John F. Kennedy as a public policy henceforth to be pursued
by the federal government, affirmative action figured as a top-priority
target on the conservative agenda, probably because no other idea is
more antithetical to self-reliance.
In the historic case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
Justice Powell was the first to deal a severe blow to affirmative action
by qualifying the notion of societal discrimination--discrimination
caused by society, not by the state, "as an amorphous concept of injury
that may be ageless in its reach into the past."94 Justice Powell issued a
strong warning against the use of such a malleable concept by political
organs because it is "free from exacting judicial scrutiny."95 He
explained his misgivings as follows: "There is no principled basis for
deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and
which would not."96 That was written in 1978, and Justice Powell was
then alone in his attack against the "amorphous concept." Eight years
92. Nixon named four conservatives: Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice, Harry A.
Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, and William H. Rehnquist. For the first time in more than
three decades, these appointments gave the Supreme Court a conservative majority.
DAVID C. WHITNEY & ROBERT VAUGHN WHITNEY, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 367 (11th
ed. 2009). True, Justice Blackmun eventually turned into a liberal as a result of a personal
transformation analyzed in his biography. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE
BLACKMUN (2005).
93. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
94. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
95. Id. at 297.
96. Id. at 296 (footnote omitted).
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later, in 1986, he was alone no longer. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
O'Connor joined him in considering that "[s]ocietal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy."97 In 1989, Justice O'Connor dealt the death-blow to the idea of
societal discrimination in the case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
when she gathered a majority behind her, including Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy, to affirm that "a
generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an
entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine
the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy."98 Justice Marshall
was justified and very lucid to write in his dissent: "[T]oday's decision
marks a deliberate and giant step backward in this Court's affirmative-
action jurisprudence." 99 Indeed, as to affirmative action as a remedy
against past discriminations, Croson, for all intents and purposes,
limited its application to those situations in which "a prima facie case of
a constitutional or statutory violation by anyone '100 could be made.
Affirmative action survives, but not as a remedy to help those who
cannot be self-reliant. It survives as a means to ensure diversity, and in
education only.
Even narrowed down to a mere device for ensuring diversity of the
student body, affirmative action may greatly serve citizenship. In his
essay Active Liberty, Justice Breyer made that point very clear when he
referred to Justice O'Connor's defense of affirmative action in Grutter v.
Bollinger: "[N]owhere is the importance of... openness more acute than
in the context of higher education. Effective participation by members of
all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if
the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."1° 1 Based on
O'Connor's defense above, Breyer argues: "What are these arguments
but an appeal to principles of solidarity, to principles of fraternity, to
principles of active liberty."10 2 Judge Richard A. Posner has already
noted that behind Breyer's enthusiastic support for affirmative action,
there was a vibrant defense of republican citizenship. Affirmative action
and republican citizenship go hand-in-hand, a combination that has led
the conservative judge to object with obvious disapproval: "Solidarity
and fraternity, yes, and these were ideals of Athenian society as of the
French Revolution, but they are not, as [Justice Breyer] implies,
97. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
98. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989).
99. Id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 500 (emphasis omitted).
101. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (citation omitted).
102. BREYER, supra note 69, at 82 (emphasis omitted).
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democratic ideals."10 3 Many people would say that solidarity and
fraternity are quintessential democratic ideals. Solidarity, which is
subsumed under "fraternity," is among the ideals of the French
Republic. 0 4 It is also a constitutional value of the European Union. No
fewer than twelve articles of the European Union's Charter of
Fundamental Rights are provided for under that value in a section
expressly titled "Solidarity."'10 5
Are the values of fraternity and solidarity enthusiastically defended
by Justice Breyer so much at odds with U.S. ideals, the only true
"democratic" ideals, as Judge Posner insinuates? The answer depends
on what is meant by citizenship, and the truth of the matter is that its
meaning is no longer the same after the conservative movement.
Citizenship is no longer associated with social equality. Conservatives
were so much opposed to social rights regarded as necessarily implied
by citizenship that they relentlessly worked at keeping them totally
separated. They argued that social rights do not belong to the public
domain, but rather to the private sphere; that social rights should never
depend on public coercion (especially taxation and redistribution of
wealth through the national budget), 106 but rather, should depend on
personal inclinations, such as Margaret Thatcher's "Victorian virtues"
of, "thrift, self-discipline, responsibility, pride in and obligation to one's
community," 107 or the qualities of "compassionate conservatism" extolled
by President George W. Bush. 0 8 They did so well that citizenship for a
103. Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699,
1710 (2006).
104. See 1958 CONST. 1 & 2 (Fr.), available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp ("France shall be [a] ... social Republic .... The maxim of the
Republic shall be 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."'). See also 1946 CONST. pmbl. § 12,
available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/
anglais/cst3.pdf.d
105. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 27-38, Dec. 18,
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 15, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/
texten.pdf. In addition, the Charter contains six other chapters, five of which are
respectively dedicated to "Dignity," "Freedoms," "Equality," "Citizens' Rights," and
"Justice." See id. chs. 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6.
106. Hence the individual mandate introduced in the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, which requires most Americans to maintain "minimum essential" health
insurance coverage. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).
107. MARGARET THATCHER, THE PATH TO POWER 554 (1995).
108. Fact Sheet: Compassionate Conservatism, GEORGE W. BUSH WHITEHOUSE (Apr. 30,
2002), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/200204t20020430.html
(quoting President George W. Bush) ("I call my philosophy and approach compassionate
conservatism. It is compassionate to actively help our fellow citizens in need. It is
conservative to insist on responsibility and results. And with this hopeful approach, we
will make a real difference in people's lives.").
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majority of the public means one thing only: the right to vote.
Conservatives buried all other political rights.
B. The Depreciation of Political Rights
Political rights are citizens' rights par excellence. They stand for the
right to participate in the public life of the state to its fullest extent,
that is, to alternatively govern and be governed, in accordance with the
exact definition of a citizen by Aristotle. 10 9 For, undoubtedly, political
rights include not only the right to vote, but also the right to be voted
upon. Concretely, being a citizen does not mean only the right to choose
the highest public officers; it also implies the right to be one of them, to
run for those offices and to hold those positions in turn. To be a citizen
in a democracy implies the right to actively participate in the
government either by voicing personal opinions in the deliberative
process, or by taking part directly in its activities as an officer. If
Lincoln's definition of a republic, "a government of the people, by the
people, for the people,"110 means something, it is that government in a
republic is not external to the people. Political rights are the means by
which that proximity takes shape.
Traditionally, political rights were held to be exercised within the
public sphere or public domain, that is, a space "carve[d] out from the
encircling market and private domains . . . [and] governed by non-
market and non-private norms." ' The state and the market were two
different entities, clearly distinct and separate. The public domain was
considered as subject to rules of public morality whose standards were
higher than those that governed the market. Ideally, it was held to be
special, different from day-to-day civil society. The values of the public
domain and the market were regarded as different, opposite even, with
altruism and disinterestedness ruling the former, and self-interest and
profit seeking governing the latter. Citizenship was regarded as a public
office proudly held by those admitted to exercise it. The franchise gave a
109. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, §1 (Benjamin Jowett trans., n.d.) (c. 350 B.C.),
available at http://www.constitution.org/ari/polit_03.htm.
110. Lincoln's definition of the republican form of government was adopted word-for-word
as "the principle" of the French republic in 1946. 1946 CONST. 2, translated in LIONEL H.
LAING ET AL., SOURCE BOOK IN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 96, 98 (Info. Div. of the French
Embassy trans., 1950), available at
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.lib.indiana.eduIHOIJPage?handle=hein.cow/zzfrOl48&collectio
n=cow. The same definition is repeated in the Constitution of October 4, 1958. 1958 CONST.
2, translated at World Constitutions llustrated, HEINONLINE (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.ib.indiana.edu/HOIAPage?handle=hein.cow/zzfrfrO1&collectio
n=cow (Constitutional Council of France trans., 2009).
111. MARQUAND, supra note 48, at 41.
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social status to its beneficiaries,11 2 so much so that it used to be that
people dressed up to go to the polls. It would not have occurred to
anyone that the public domain was a "market." Or, if it did, it was in a
humorous vein, as when Mark Twain characterized the erratic behavior
of a young man who happened to be "Whig to-day, Democrat the next
week, and anything fresh that he could find in the political market the
week after,"1 3 or as when Sir Arthur James Balfour, commenting upon
the fate of a bill laid on the table of the House of Commons, predicted
that "[t]he result will doubtless be determined by the 'higgling' of the
'political market."'11 4
Today, the term "political market" is part of vernacular language as
well as of scientific studies. The public domain is a market. It is
routinely presented as entirely governed by the individual preferences
of its actors, voters, and candidates. How can we explain such a
transformation? The answer lies in one single fact: economic analysis
rules the study of political behavior and process. An economic approach
has displaced the institutional and legal approach that was based on
procedural perspectives. This is not the place to recall how this
development took place. Suffice it to say that it emerged out of the
systemic analysis developed by David Easton in political theory." 5 In
the early 1950s, after Gabriel A. Almond identified the Anglo-American
political systems as "saturated with the atmosphere of the market,"11 6
112. In France, under the so-called "Monarchy of July," when universal suffrage no
longer existed (it had been withdrawn after the fall of Napol6on and the Restoration of the
monarchy), the following dialogue took place between the President of the Court and the
accused (Louis-Auguste Blanqui, a famous French revolutionary) at the beginning of the
trial of the "Socigtd des amis du peuple" in 1832:






The President: That is not a status.
Blanqui: What do you mean, it's not a status! It's the status of 30
million of French people who live from their work and who are
deprived of political rights!
The President: All right! Let it be then. Registrar, write that the
accused is proletarian."
PIERRE ROSANVALLON, LE SACRE DU CITOYEN 338 (2001).
113. Mark Twain, Chapters from my Autobiography.- X., 184 N. AM. REV. 113, 115
(1907) (emphasis added).
114. Arthur James Balfour, The New House of Commons and the Irish Question, 155 N.
AM. REV. 641, 648 (1892) (emphasis added).
115. See DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 90 (1953).
116. Gabriel A. Almond, Comparative Political Systems, 18 J. POL. 391, 398 (1956).
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meaning, free, open, and competitive. The term "political market" came
to designate the public domain, whose role model was the market place
of liberal economies. It did not take long before the image of the market
turned into the criterion of liberal political systems.
The problem is that with the word "market" came the culture
associated with it. The values of the marketplace became those of the
public domain. As producers and consumers are driven by their own
private interests in the marketplace, politicians and electors, too, are
regarded as driven by individual preferences on the political market.
That unfortunate result explains the impressive success of public choice
theory that has accustomed the public to view legislation as "the result
of a political market, with demand and supply features."117 The
marketization of politics changed the nature of the public domain
insofar as business morality replaced public morality. Politicians are
expected to be driven by their individual preferences, and citizens
legitimately exercise their political rights as buyers (of public goods) and
sellers (of personal votes). "Uncivism" has been turned into a right.
Under such circumstances, political rights either have been turned into
a commodity that can be bought on the market like bushels of wheat
(such is the case of the public offices that are filled by election), or they
have been silenced because their object was transferred from the public
to the private sector (such is the case with the right of the governed to
hold officials accountable for their administration, which turns into an
elusive promise when public services are privatized).
1. The Right to Run for Office
No political right has been more affected by the paradigm of the
market than the right to run for office. As mentioned before, that right
is the mirror of the right to vote in a republic. However, due to the
conservative jurisprudence on the role of money in politics, that right
seems nowadays to be located in a very distant mirror, to the point that
it is inaccessible for a majority of the citizenry. Not only is the price to
pay for advertisement to get a chance to be elected beyond the means of
most citizens, but also, and more importantly, some citizens may drive
their competitors out of the market just because of their wealth. There
is hardly another political right that has been more deeply affected by
the conservative movement than that to run for office. Money draws the
117. DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY
155 (4th ed. 2009).
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line between those who may expect a public office and those who may
not. Nobility by wealth has replaced nobility by birth.
Nobility by wealth is the legacy of Buckley v. Valeo,118 a landmark
case of the Justice Burger Court that stands for the following
proposition: "money is speech."'119 Of course, money is not speech; money
is property, hence power, and power buys speech. Money therefore
"enables speech," as Justice Breyer said.120  What is, however,
interesting in that wrongful equation between money and speech is that
it gave the Court the possibility to adjudicate the case under one, and
only one, single provision-the First Amendment. Buckley reviewed the
Federal Election Campaign Act under that provision only. The other
provision that had a bearing on the case, the Equal Protection Clause
(guaranteed to citizens by both the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments),
was barely addressed by the Court, which regarded the argument made
by the appellees aimed at grounding limitations on electoral
expenditures on a possible "equaliz[ation] [of] the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" as
"ancillary."1 21 Leaving aside the weak legal foundations of this dogmatic
affirmation in the light of the proper methods of constitutional
interpretation, 22 the Court could not have said more clearly that
substantive equality was a trifling matter in the electoral process.
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
119. Id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 425 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
121. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48, 54.
122. Reliance on a single constitutional provision to review the constitutionality of a
statute does not comport with the classical methods of constitutional interpretation. As
Chief Justice John Marshall warned in a much celebrated statement, "we must never
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
407 (1819). Arguably, that meant that the state of Maryland was wrong to rely on a single
provision, a single word even-the adjective "necessary" in the "necessary and proper
clause," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18-to prove that the Bank of the United States was not
necessary. The Constitution as a whole had to be taken into consideration, answered
Marshall, because, as he put it, it does not "partake of the prolixity of a legal code ....
[O]nly its great outlines [are] marked," with the result that, for "its receiving a fair and
just interpretation," all its provisions are to be read together; all of them are connected to
each other. Id. In that case, which raised the question of the necessity of a United States
Bank, Marshall relied on both the taxation and the war powers to prove that, indeed, the
bank was much needed, because, as he said, "Throughout this vast republic, from the St.
Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be collected and
expended, armies are to be marched and supported." Id. at 408. Must the Court not follow
the same principle of interpretation when rights, not federal powers, are concerned? In
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court answered in the affirmative when
it recognized a right to marital privacy as emanating from several provisions of the Bill of
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As long as formal equality is respected-as long as each citizen may
expect to have his or her name on the ballot-constitutional equality is
satisfied. The First Amendment trumps all other constitutional
provisions, a hard fact that the Court summarized as follows: "[T]he
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment."'123 The First Amendment therefore
makes it impossible to limit the amount of money that circulates in the
electoral process, save for one motive only, to prevent actual and
apparent corruption. As to the poor candidate that has not accumulated
"a huge campaign war chest,"124 it is too bad for her. Nothing in the
Constitution protects her against being dwarfed and defeated by a
millionaire-nothing, except federal and state citizenship recognized for
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States." The conservative
movement has divorced the most important right among political rights
from citizenship. The only political right that has been left intact is the
right to vote. But no matter how fundamental it is, the right to vote is
not enough to make a republic, for it may also exist in a monarchy.
What truly differentiates the citizen from the subject is that the latter is
not necessarily entitled to occupy a public office, whereas the former is
emphatically called to that station.
2. The Right to Hold Officials Accountable
To be a citizen gives the right to participate in the political process.
That participation may take many forms. It may take place at the ballot
box, in the media, and today, on the social networks. But the right of the
citizen cannot be subsumed solely under a right to be publicly vocal. It
materializes into the right to make determinations that will affect the
rights and interests of those who compete to get power or to keep it. Of
particular importance in that respect is the right to hold officials
accountable to their mandate.
Accountability is usually verified at elections, when incumbents run
for further service. The right of citizens to hold their congressional
representatives accountable for the public policies supported while in
office by voting them out is crucial to the integrity of the democratic
Rights read and taken together as a whole. Principled methods of constitutional
interpretation cannot justify that different methods may apply to the Bill of Rights and to
the Constitution. If so, what is it, then, that would justify reviewing campaign finance
cases against freedom of speech only? Save for Buckley v. Valeo, which dodged the
question, the Court has never given an answer.
123. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
124. Id. at 265 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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process. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court held
unconstitutional an attempt by Arkansas to limit that right by imposing
fixed terms limits on congressional representatives and senators. 125 But,
with privatization of so many public services, that right dwindles, for
the private sector takes the place of elected officials in deciding public
policies. This is what has happened in domains such as education and
public health, where citizens were accustomed to acting in pursuance of
public choices. Privatization converted these public choices into private
choices. With their privatization programs, conservatives obliged
individuals, who are citizens and electors, to act according to their own
private choices, like consumers in the market place.
Education is a case in point. After the Supreme Court refused in
1973 to invalidate the huge financial inequities between school districts
as incompatible with equal protection, 126 the matter was sent back to
the state courts, which did not fare better in finding a solution to the
problem. 127 Eventually, it was decided that states should encourage
market competition among private and public schools by subsidizing
tuition costs for private school attendance.1 28 This is how school
vouchers as a method for financing schools became more effective than
public appropriations in carrying out educational public policies. Private
choice replaced public choice, and reliance on private choices to carry
out public policies grew in proportion. The end result is that, should the
public service of education not educate children the way it ought to,
citizens may no longer turn to their elected representatives and the
political process to change the course of action. Decisions in the field of
public education have been shifted to the market; citizens may no longer
blame public officers, but themselves; they have been transformed into
consumers. Privatization may not have a detrimental effect on
citizenship when it is in the domain of, say, public transportation or
public utilities, but when it comes to educational matters, indirect
privatization of public schools is a problem for two reasons at least-
first, because "the function of the school system is to give everyone the
necessary abilities to effectively participate to public life and to occupy
public positions,"129 and, second, because no public policy of education of
substance may emerge from a multitude of private choices.
125. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 836 (1995).
126. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
127. See Sherry, supra note 14.
128. Id. at 199-200.
129. DOMINIQUE SCHNAPPER (with the collaboration of Christian Bachelier), QU'EST-CE
QUE LA CITOYENNETV? 154 (2000).
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the legacy of the conservative movement with respect
to citizenship is worrisome, to say the least. That notion which,
throughout American history had already "proved to be an
indeterminate legal concept," 130  has been torn into pieces. In
exacerbating individualism and in encouraging huge financial
inequalities between citizens through irresponsible tax policies based
upon the idea that the wealth of the affluent class will trickle down
throughout the channels of society and eventually reach the poor,131 the
conservatives have eviscerated the meaning of citizenship. Weaving the
social fabric back again between the people is the greatest challenge of
globalization in the next twenty years.
Arguably, Chief Justice John Roberts made the first step in that
direction when he justified the individual mandate requiring most
Americans to buy health insurance by relying on the taxing power of
Congress, not the commerce clause. 132 For all intents and purposes, his
legal reasoning means that citizens cannot opt out of citizenship at no
cost-as the conservatives claimed-on the ground that Congress
cannot regulate individuals "precisely because they are doing
nothing."' 33  In supporting the constitutionality of the "shared
responsibility payment" imposed on those who do not comply with the
mandate by relying on political, not economic reasons, 34 Chief Justice
Roberts resurrected the true meaning of citizenship in a republic-
130. Stephen A. Conrad, Citizenship, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW
101, 101 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2002).
131. As Neil Brooks wrote in a prophetic piece,
[Taxes] have been reconceptualized in a way that makes them appear
as illegitimate and inherently undesirable. They are frequently
characterized as "impositions" over which taxpayers have no control,
"burdens" from which they derive no benefit ....
[The] tax-cutting agenda is profoundly wrong. In the long run it
will increase social inequality, result in national economies being less
productive, result in civil societies being less flourishing, and it will
ultimately lead to social disintegration and a loss of a sense of
connectedness between people.
Brooks, supra note 6, at 356-57.
132. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593, 2600 (2012).
133. Id. at 2587 (emphasis omitted).
134. Taxes are not merely what Louis Eisenstein called "a constitutional means of
appropriating private property without just compensation," LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE
IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 6 (1961), available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/
Page?handle=hein.tera/idetaxnOO0l&div-l&gsent=l&collection=tera; they also "provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1.
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"interdependence on each other."'135 It is, however, too early to say
whether that signal sent by the Chief Justice will be a shooting star in
the night or the dawning of a new age.
135. Roosevelt, supra note 77, at 14.
